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Introduction
The U.S. employment relations system is at a historic crossroads equivalent to that of
the 1930s. The strategies adopted by government, business, and labor representatives in the
initial phase of the Clinton Administration will determine whether U.S. employment relations
continue evolving from a rigid, adversarial model suited to the needs of the past to one that can
help to achieve the mutual economic and social gains envisioned in the term "a high skills and
high wages economy." Not since the eve of the New Deal has an Administration faced as
critical a set of decisions and as great an opportunity to achieve a fundamental breakthrough in
employment policy and practice. Fortunately, the principles underlying what will be described
here as a new "Mutual Gains" paradigm have been largely sketched out already through the trial
and error experimentation that has taken place in the private sector in recent years. The new
Administration's task is therefore to provide the leadership and the policies needed to support
the diffusion of these principles across the economy.
Principles of the "Mutual Gains" Paradigm
The innovations introduced in various workplaces over the past decade generally involved
efforts to implement the broad principles outlined in Figure 1. Together, these principles add
up to what can be called a "Mutual Gains" employment relationship, i.e., one that attempts to
pursue strategies and practices that support the goals of the firm to be competitive and achieve
a fair return to its owners while also meeting the goals of its workforce for high wages and
working conditions.2 The key linchpins in achieving and sustaining mutual gains are continuous
2These principles have been described, studied, and advocated by a wide variety of authors,
study groups, and commissions and have been given various names. See for example, Richard
improvement in productivity and innovation and equitable distribution of the gains among the
various stakeholders of the firm. To do this firms must be effective at integrating technology
and human resources and gaining full advantage from these assets.
While the specific practices needed to achieve these mutual gains will vary across
different employment settings, they all start with a recognition that high productivity and
innovation require a well educated and highly skilled workforce and employment practices that
fully utilize these skills on the job. Employee participation in problem solving and continuous
improvement activities and flexibility in the organization of work serve as the starting points for
mutual gains strategies. To sustain employee trust and commitment to continuous improvement
these workplace practices must be supported by adequate investment in training and human
resource development, a demonstrated commitment to managing for employment security, and
a willingness and ability to integrate human resource planning with the competitive strategies and
decisions of top management. Finally, the firm must be committed to a long term strategy of
competing on the basis of continuous improvement in quality, innovation, customer service as
well as cost control and recognize that employees are stakeholders who, like the firm's owners,
E. Walton, "Toward a Strategy of Eliciting Employee Commitment Based on Policies of
Mutuality," in Richard E. Walton and Paul R. Lawrence, HRM Trends and Patterns, Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1985, 35-65; Thomas A. Kochan, Harry R. Katz, and Robert
B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books,
1986; The Collective Bargaining Forum, Labor-Management Commitment: A Compact for
Change, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1991; Alan Blinder (ed.) Paying for
Productivity, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990; or Barry Bluestone and
Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future, New York: Basic Books, 1992. Alternatively, see
the reports of various university or national competitiveness or productivity commissions such
as Michael Dertouzos, Richard Lester, and Robert Solow, Made in America, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1989 or any of the last five Secretary of Labor's Commissions on labor market and
workforce strategies.
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should share in both the risks and the rewards of the enterprise and, therefore, should participate
in the governance of the firm similar to other key financial stakeholders. In return, this
approach requires, and generally obtains a corresponding commitment by employees and labor
organizations to addressing the competitive challenges facing the firm.
The above brief description is an oversimplified caricature of the mutual gains'
enterprise. But what has been the actual experience of firms, employees, and unions that have
attempted to move toward this model? In unionized firms the most significant innovations
have come where management accepts union leaders as legitimate partners and recognizes their
need for organizational security by not automatically opposing union organization of new plants
or worksites. Companies such as Xerox, Coming, Ford, GM, Chrysler, AT&T, Bridgestone
Tire, and American Airlines have all benefitted from these types of positive relationships at
various points in time over the course of the past decade. In addition to these highly visible
examples, most firms and their unions have attempted to introduce some of the features noted
in Figure 1. However, because many of these parties were either unable or unwilling to make
the full scale changes or to remain committed to the change process long enough to experience
its benefits, a number of them have fallen back into traditional patterns. Most, however, remain
stalled somewhere between the traditional and the new paradigm recognizing that the old system
no longer meets their needs but unable to overcome the obstacles that block their path to the new
paradigm.
In non-union companies innovation has been concentrated among large, growing firms
led by CEOs or founders who were personally committed to mutual commitment strategies.
Polaroid, IBM, Delta Airlines, Hewlett Packard, Digital Equipment Company, Honda, Federal
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Express among others all developed reputations for these practices at various times throughout
the 1980s. Many of these firms also experienced significant setbacks in recent years as their
markets matured and they were unable to maintain their commitments to employment security.
These innovations, when sustained over a long period of time, have proved to be highly
productive. At Xerox, for example, executives will attest that they could not have recaptured
the market share lost to the Japanese in the 1970s, nor could they have won the Baldridge award
for quality improvement, without the labor-management innovations and partnership the company
achieved with its employees and union representatives. In the auto industry, the evidence could
not be clearer. For example, in the mid 1980s, the Toyota-GM joint venture plant called
NUMMI for "New United Motors Manufacturing Inc." demonstrated the power of this new
model in working with the UAW to achieve the highest productivity and quality performance
of any auto plant in the country. Since then all the auto companies have embraced the principle
of teamwork, training, and employee empowerment along with new manufacturing methods that
minimize inventories, space, and materials to build quality into the product the first time. They
took these actions in response to the clear empirical evidence that effective implementation of
these principles and their corresponding flexible manufacturing principles are needed to achieve
world class levels of productivity, product quality, and capacity to innovate.3 GM's Saturn
Corporation has turned its labor-management partnership into a competitive advantage by
marketing itself and its product as a "New Kind of Car and a New Kind of Company." At
3See for example James J.Womack, Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine that
Changed the World, New York: Rawson-MacMillan, 1990 and John Paul MacDuffie and John
F. Krafcik, "Integrating Technology and Human Resources for High-Performance
Manufacturing," in Thomas A. Kochan and Michael Useem, (eds.) Transforming Organizations,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; 209-26.
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Saturn the UAW is a total partner with management from the shop floor to the CEO.
But these innovative relationships are still the exception rather than the rule. While they
have spread gradually throughout most of the 1980s, they remain fragile and, in recent years
have been stalled by a number of economic and institutional barriers. It is these barriers that
will need to be attacked if these isolated innovations are to be diffused broadly enough across
the American industry to achieve the macro economic results they promise.
Obstacles to Diffusion
Short Term Time Horizons. The biggest barrier to widespread adoption and diffusion
of this new model has been the pressures on corporations to downsize and demonstrate short
term cost containment and profit improvements. While some of this pressure is cyclical and
reflects the consequences of the deep and prolonged recession of the past several years, part of
the problem reflects more permanent features of U.S. capital markets. The short term time
horizons U.S. capital markets and financial institutions impose on American managers are now
recognized to be a serious constraint limiting the diffusion of human resource and labor-
management innovations.4 Indeed, a recent survey managers cited short term pressures as the
single biggest factor limiting progress in this area.5
Market Failures. But short term time horizons and cyclical pressures are only part of
the problem. A deeper market failure is also at work here. To date, these innovations have
proceeded on an isolated, individual, firm by firm basis. However, most individual firms are
4See Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices. Washington, D.C,: Council on Competitiveness,
1992.
5Edward E. Lawler III et.al., Employee Involvement and Total Ouality Management, San
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1992.
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unwilling to absorb the full costs of the transition unless they have some assurance that their
product and labor market competitors will make similar investments. Training investments
provide the clearest example. A firm will invest in training to the extent that it can appropriate
the benefits of the investment in enhanced employee skills. Unfortunately, the costs of training
are absorbed immediately on the firm's profit and loss statement but the benefits of enhancing
skills come gradually over time. Meanwhile the newly trained employees become more
attractive to competitors who can bid these employees away and achieve the benefits of these
higher skills without making the investment. Or, if the economy sours and the firm lays off
these employees, it again loses the investment to the external market. Thus, rather than invest
in these skills, a rational firm will try to minimize the skill requirements of the job through other
means--automation, tight supervision, narrow job descriptions, etc.--exactly the features that
keep firms trapped in a low skill/low wage and a rigid high conflict/low trust relationship.
Solving this type of classic market failure problem therefore requires government action.6
Policies that induce more firms to make these investments would help individual firms reap the
returns on their investments and place competitive pressures on others to match these benefits
to attract and retain qualified employees. In this way the new paradigm diffuses and translates
into gains for individual firms and the macro economy and society.
Antiquated Labor Law. Beyond these economic obstacles lies an equally significant legal
barrier: the antiquated features of American labor law. Passed as part of the New Deal effort
to lift the country out of the Great Depression, the National Labor Relations Act served the
6See for example, David I. Levine and Laura D' Andreas Tyson, "Participation,
Productivity, and the Firm's Environment," in Alan S. Blinder (ed.) Paying for Productivity,
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991, 183-236.
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American workforce and the economy well in an era when the challenge was to build a stable
collective bargaining process that could resolve peacefully the deep and often violent conflicts
erupting between workers and employers and provide a means for workers to increase their
purchasing power as the overall economy improved. In short, the law that established collective
bargaining rights did a good job of resolving conflicting interests of labor and management.
It has not, however, been as successful in encouraging joint problem solving where the potential
for mutual gains exist. Moreover, over time the law has even lost its ability to provide workers
voice in workplace decisions that have the greatest effects on their long run economic security.
Thus, today the vast majority of American workers do not have access to institutions that give
them an effective voice over the issues that matter most to them at the workplace.
The current law has three basic flaws that must be remedied if workers are to be
empowered to help diffuse innovative practices across the American workplace. First, the law
must go beyond the rather rigid and narrow form of participation it currently provides--exclusive
representation in collective bargaining over a predetermined set of issues involving wages, hours,
and working conditions. Participation via informal work groups, employee-management
committees, or consultative groups over issues such as production problems, capital investment
in new technologies, or design of new facilities or work processes were not envisioned in the
law. Indeed, as of this writing, a case pending before the National Labor Relations Board (the
Electromation case) challenges the legality of some of these informal types of participation.7
Thus, the law must be updated to accommodate and support these newer forms of employee
7See Stephen I. Schlossberg and Miriam Birgit Reinhart, "Electromation and the Future of
Labor-Management Cooperation," Labor Law Journal, September, 1992, 608-20.
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participation and empowerment.
Second, the law's enforcement has eroded in recent years to the point that it no longer
provides effective access to collective representation for most workers. Any employer
determined to avoid unionization or discourage organizing drives can do so through a variety of
legal delaying tactics and/or illegal practices that seldom result in enforcement actions that are
quick or expensive enough to deter such conduct. g Frustration over this aspect of the law and
its effects on the ability to organize has been the single biggest argument some union leaders
give for opposing "innovation" in labor management relations. Addressing these problems in
the law and its enforcement should, once and for all, eliminate this argument and take this issue
off the table.
Third, the NLRA leaves a large number of supervisors and middle managers outside its
scope of protection and does not effectively contend with the diversity of occupational groups
found in the contemporary workplace. Managerial and supervisory employees, for example,
face significant job security risks in the current environment and hold the keys to implementing
the organizational reforms needed to sustain continuous improvement in organizational
performance. Moreover, although not legally excluded from coverage under the law, the vast
majority of non-production workers--professional, technical, and office workers are, for all
practical purposes, left out. The types of participation these workers want and need cannot be
satisfied by formal collective bargaining rights carried on in separate bargaining units as
envisioned in the current labor law. These groups need to be part of cross functional teams
8For an excellent review of the problems with current labor law and options for reform see
Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
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working hand in hand with each other and with production workers to design and implement new
products, technologies, and organizational practices. To require engineers, technicians, other
professionals, or office workers to form separate bargaining units and petition for exclusive
representation so they can bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions only constructs
further functional barriers that organizations now are desperately trying to remove in order to
improve the innovation process. Thus these groups also need to be enfranchised in a way that
supports and facilitates the innovation process.
Addressing these issues requires more than minor, incremental modifications of
contemporary labor law. It will require endorsing forms of participation and representation that
are specifically designed to promote mutual gains employment practices and extend these
policies to cover the full diversity of employees found in contemporary workplaces. For this,
as well as other reasons, it is time to open up American labor law to allow experimentation with
organization wide participatory and representative arrangements that serve as the American
equivalent to European style works councils.9
Deteriorating Union-Management Relations. Another serious obstacle to broader
diffusion lies in the worsening and self reinforcing low trust/high conflict cycle that continues
to dominate union-management relations in the U.S. This cycle is perpetuated by:
1. continued union membership losses (membership has declined from 33% of the
labor force in the mid 1950s to 24% in 1980 to 16% today--12% of the private
sector);
9For a discussion of the role of works councils in the German industrial relations system see
Kirsten S. Wever and Christopher S. Allen, "Is Germany a Model for Managers?" Harvard
Business Review, September-October, 1992, 36-43.
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2. the open and sometimes aggressive opposition of the majority of American
companies (through both legal and illegal means) to union organizing;
3. declining capacity of local union and management leaders to sustain cooperative
relations as labor gets backed farther into a corner and sees it institutional
survival threatened and management experiences intensified pressures to reduce
costs and produce short run profits.
4. declining employee (both blue and white collar, managerial and non-managerial)
trust in top management--in union and nonunion firms--as a result of continued
layoffs, growing inequality in income, and declining real wages.
This, unfortunately, is the dominant state of affairs in employee relations today. As a
result, there are significant pent-up frustrations building within the American workforce that are
likely to explode at some point if we continue down this path.
Historical Parallel: The Eve of the New Deal
The parallel between the current state of affairs and the 1930s is quite remarkable. Then,
as now, a new Administration took office with a mandate to bring the country out of the
Depression; union representation had experienced a decade of decline in part because its craft
mode of organizing and representing workers no longer fit the growing manufacturing workforce
and mass production enterprises and in part because employers had introduced management led
and dominated practices for employee involvement. But the economic pressures of the
Depression proved to be too powerful for these management initiated innovations to be
sustained. It was therefore left to the new Administration and Congress to fashion a New Deal
employment and labor relations policy that could provide the micro-economic and institutional
foundation for sustained commitment to practices needed to support other economic strategies
for putting the economy on a path of long term economic growth. This meant institutionalizing
collective bargaining and minimum standards for wages, working hours and other conditions so
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that the intense conflicts erupting between workers and employers could be resolved, firms could
pursue expanding domestic mass production markets, and employees could share in the
prosperity that they helped to produce. But, to achieve the new paradigm envisioned in the New
Deal model required fundamental shifts in ideology and strategy on the part of labor, business,
and above all, government. The same is true today. We therefore now turn to a discussion of
the changes required by each of these parties if a shift to a mutual gains paradigm is to be
achieved.
A New Role for Labor
If the new paradigm is to spread, existing labor unions and perhaps new associations or
organizations will need to arise to fill the void in worker representation that currently exists in
the American workplace. But whatever organizations fill this void will need to champion and
support a variety of forms of employee participation and representation in addition to traditional
collective bargaining and grievance handling.
Indeed, the innovations of the past decade produced a major debate within the labor
movement over whether to endorse and champion new forms of participation or to press for
labor law reforms to strengthen traditional collective bargaining once a more friendly President
and Congress are returned to office. While the number of supporters of the innovative model
has expanded somewhat in recent years, the pent up frustrations of what labor leaders see as
twelve years of neglect of labor law leads some within the labor movement to favor lobbying
hard for a series of individual legislative initiatives such as a striker replacement bill, reform of
OSHA, improvements in unemployment compensation, a stronger North American Free Trade
Agreement, etc. The list goes on. Those favoring this approach agree that changes in union
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strategies are needed but argue that a "level playing field" for labor relations must be achieved
first. According to this view, only then will labor leaders be able to cooperate with
management.
If this approach dominates labor's political agenda it will sour the political and labor-
management environment and face stiff opposition from a Congress that will see the labor
movement as promoting its "special interests" in the absence of a viable long run vision for its
role in the economy or as the voice for the work force of the future. If the advocates of a return
to traditional approaches dominate, we can also expect continuation of the deteriorating cycle
of conflict at the workplace as progressive managers lose confidence in the ability of union
leaders to support innovation. Indeed, unless labor becomes a more positive and visible
champion for a new approach and demonstrates its determination to lead efforts to achieve it at
the workplace, the American workforce, American management, and public policy makers will
continue to view labor as a largely negative or at best irrelevant force at the workplace and in
economic and social affairs.
What specifically would a new approach imply for labor's strategy? It would require
labor to become a competent, full service advocate and technical resource supporting employee
participation in workplace problem solving, labor management committees devoted to topics such
as safety and health, design and implementation of new technologies and work systems, training
and human resource development institutions and programs, employee stock ownership plans and
their associated corporate governance roles, and human resource advisory councils that serve
functions similar to European style works councils. All of these, in addition to formal collective
bargaining and grievance handling, must be encouraged by new laws but it will be up to labor
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to give these practices life and vigor at the workplace. In doing so, labor can put forward a new
and positive vision and image that is consistent with the forms of participation needed in the
economy and desired by the workforce. Only by doing so will it be able to reverse its decline
in membership and influence in society.
New Strategies for American Business Leaders
Management led the way in introducing innovations in the American workplace in the
past decade in large part out of a pragmatic recognition that traditional labor management
relations no longer work in a world that requires flexibility, continuous improvements in
productivity, problem solving, and cost reduction. The problem is that the champions of
innovation within American management have not been influential or large enough in numbers
to sustain the commitment to these principles in the face of opposition of managers who do not
share their views and in an economic and capital market environment where pressures for short
term cost reduction, profits, and employment reductions dominate strategic decision-making.
Management must recognize two things. First, individual firms acting alone, cannot
sustain a commitment to innovation. Firms must build the support and commitment of other
firms in their industry, customer and supplier communities, and labor markets. Second,
management must recognize that it cannot sustain commitment to a high productivity/high trust
strategy without accepting workers and their representatives as partners in this process. This
means that business must reign in its recalcitrant colleagues who prefer to resist any new
employee or union rights to participation. Too many American managers cling to an outmoded
union avoidance ideology and thereby perpetuate the labor-management conflicts that the 1930s
legislation sought to put to rest! The irony therefore is that innovative management leaders
14
cannot hope to achieve their objectives unless they form a coalition with like minded labor and
government representatives and create an environment and policy framework that facilitate and
support widespread adoption and diffusion of these innovations.
A Mutual Gains Employment Policy
As the Clinton Administration takes office it faces intense pressure to respond to the pent-
up demand for legislative action on a wide array of worker rights and labor standards that were
ignored or undermined during the Reagan-Bush years. Past administrations have responded to
these issues by separating labor and employment policy from other economic and social policy
making groups and initiatives. Labor policy was treated as "special interest" politics. But this
risks repeating the stalemate in labor and human resource policy experienced by the Carter
Administration where labor, business, or groups within government could each successfully
block legislative or administrative initiatives but no single actor could unilaterally impose its
own policy ideas or successfully form an alliance to enact new, positive policies.
For all these reasons, the new Administration has both an opportunity and an obligation
to avoid a similar stalemate and to serve as the catalyst for diffusing the new employment
relations paradigm. To do so a Mutual Gains Employment Policy will be needed that is
integrated with and supportive of other macro economic policies for creating a high skill-high
wage economy.
A strategy for doing so would need three key elements: (1) strong and clearly articulated
Presidential support and leadership; (2) an integrated administrative structure and process that
incorporates human resource and labor issues directly into economic policy making processes,
and (3) a proactive legislative program. The Administration's support for tax incentives for
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investment in R & D, plant and equipment, infrastructure, and worker training provide a solid
foundation for this approach.
It will take the strong, committed, and personal leadership of the President to shift the
national labor-management climate from one dominated by mistrust, confrontation, litigation,
and polarization in policy debates and practice to one of partnership, innovation, and eventually
consensus over labor and human resource issues. The President can demonstrate his
determination to achieve this shift in the national climate by personally endorsing and
encouraging diffusion of innovative workplace practices as a necessary and integral component
of his economic strategy. But the President will also need to make it clear he will not only
encourage but will require changes in business and labor practices and strategies by making his
support for employment policy reforms and for favorable tax treatment for investment in
research and development, capital investment, and worker training contingent on business and
labor support. Likewise, the President can organize his Administration in ways that insure
employment policy is effectively integrated with other aspects of economic policy. This too will
signal the Administration's determination to treat these issues seriously.
But ultimately a comprehensive legislative program will be needed to implement a Mutual
Gains employment policy. The elements of a comprehensive program might include micro
based incentives that couple investment in hardware, research and development, and worker
training with the changes in workplace practices and relationships required to achieve the full
return on these investments and a fundamental transformation of labor law. More specifically,
such a program might include:
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a. Enactment of an R&D tax credit, a capital investment tax credit, and/or a training tax
offset or other incentives for firms to invest in human resource development as called for
in the President's campaign platform. But, these tax benefits should only be allowed if
employers provide clear evidence of employee consultation in the use of these funds.
This would encourage innovation from the grass roots, provide all (union and nonunion)
employees with a voice in the design and delivery of human resource policies affecting
them, and allow these innovations to be tailored to the particular needs of different
employers and workers.
b. Fundamental updating of labor law to remove existing legal barriers to workplace
innovations and support more varied forms of employee participation and to remedy the
weaknesses in the law and its administration that now limit worker access to union
representation and collective bargaining. The law should open up opportunities for
experimentation with a wide variety of participatory forms including quality circles and
similar problem solving groups, self managing work teams, employee-management
committees devoted to specific issues such as training, safety and health, or new
technology, establishment wide committees similar in makeup and function to European
style works councils, and employee representation on corporate boards of directors
and/or Employee Stock Owner Plan Trustee committees. To remedy the problems with
enforcement of existing labor law the process of union recognition should be streamlined
and simplified, violations of the law should be penalized severely and quickly, and either
party should have the right to submit unresolved contract disputes to third party
arbitration in lieu of a strike or lockout.
c. Expanded support for programs that empower workers and managers to take
responsibility for administering and enforcing labor standards and human resource
policies. Safety and health is the logical starting point for this approach. After suitable
experimentation in this arena, this strategy might be applied to other policy areas as well.
Summary
This paper outlined a blueprint for an employment relations paradigm and suggested a
new public policy framework for diffusing this paradigm across the economy. Like any
blueprint, it will need modification as it moves from the drawing board through the policy
making process and is tested in practice. It is presented here to encourage a national debate over
these issues.
What are the consequences of not embarking on a new approach? If we continue to drift
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down the path that has dominated employment relations in recent years we can expect increased
labor-management conflict and limited diffusion of innovation at the workplace, a political
stalemate over labor policy, and the failure of macro economic efforts to restore competitiveness
given lack of supportive practices at the level of the firm. These results can and must be
avoided.
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Figure 1
Principles Guiding
Mutual Commitment Firms
Strategic Level
Supportive Business Strategies
Top Management Value Commitment
Effective Voice for HR in Strategy Making and Governance
Functional (Human Resource Policy) Level
Staffing Based on Employment Stabilization
Investment in Training and Development
Contingent Compensation That Reinforces Cooperation,
Participation, and Contribution
Workplace Level
Selection Based on High Standards
Broad Task Design and Teamwork
Employee Involvement in Problem-Solving
Climate of Cooperation and Trust
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